Published in Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), 2023
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms for selecting agents with private costs from various groups to ensure proportional representation, where the minimum proportion of the overall value of the selected agents from each group is maximized.
Published in International Workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics (IJTCS) & Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), 2022
In this paper, we design a budget-feasible incentive mechanism which can guarantee truthfulness and deter Sybil attack.
Published in IEEE Transaction on Mobile Computing (TMC), 2022
In this paper, we investigate budget-feasible mechanisms in two-sided crowdsensing markets where multiple strategic requesters come with private budgets to obtain services from the strategic users.
Published in International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2021
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms for selecting agents with private costs from various groups to ensure proportional representation.
Published in AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2021
This paper studies the budget-feasible mechanism design over graphs, where a buyer wishes to procure items from sellers, and all participants (the buyer and sellers) can only directly interact with their neighbors during the auction campaign.
Published in International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2018
This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items as possible from the strategic sellers.