Xiang Liu

Xiang Liu

Your biography for the left-hand sidebar

Posts by Collection

portfolio

publications

Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets

Published in International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI), 2018

This paper considers the mechanism design problem in two-sided markets where multiple strategic buyers come with budgets to procure as much value of items as possible from the strategic sellers.

Budget feasible mechanisms over graphs

Published in AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 2021

This paper studies the budget-feasible mechanism design over graphs, where a buyer wishes to procure items from sellers, and all participants (the buyer and sellers) can only directly interact with their neighbors during the auction campaign.

Budget-Feasible Sybil-Proof Mechanisms for Crowdsensing

Published in International Workshop on Frontiers in Algorithmics (IJTCS) & Theoretical Computer Science (TCS), 2022

In this paper, we design a budget-feasible incentive mechanism which can guarantee truthfulness and deter Sybil attack.

Budget-feasible Mechanisms for Proportionally Selecting Agents from Groups

Published in Artificial Intelligence (AIJ), 2023

In this paper, we consider the problem of designing budget-feasible mechanisms for selecting agents with private costs from various groups to ensure proportional representation, where the minimum proportion of the overall value of the selected agents from each group is maximized.

talks

teaching