XIANG LIU
I received my B.Sc. from Dalian University of Technology in 2016 and my Ph.D. from the Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Southeast University in 2023, under the supervision of Prof. Weiwei Wu. I am currently a postdoctoral researcher at Southeast University and an honored joint postdoc in ANSR Lab at The Chinese University of Hong Kong and Southeast University, supervised by Prof. John C.S. Lui. Previously, I worked as a research assistant at City University of Hong Kong with Prof. Minming Li.
Research Interests
Auction and Pricing Mechanism: Design strategy-proof and revenue-maximizing auctions that dynamically price divisible or indivisible goods under budget, capacity, and fairness constraints in various real-world applications.
Online Learning Algorithm Design and Analysis: Develop regret-optimal algorithms for bandit and full-information settings, providing tight theoretical guarantees and efficient implementations for non-stationary, combinatorial, or graph-structured action spaces.
Reinforcement Learning: Create sample-efficient RL methods, including model-based, model-free, and hybrid approaches, that handle large state-action spaces via function approximation, transfer learning, and safe exploration.
LLM-based Multi-agent System: Orchestrate LLM agents that negotiate, coordinate, and self-improve through natural-language communication, leveraging emergent reasoning to solve cooperative or competitive tasks while maintaining interpretability and alignment.
I am always open to collaborating with researchers whose interests overlap, or even just touch, mine, and I am currently recruiting motivated graduate students; please feel free to reach out.
NEWS
2025-02: Our one new paper on budgeted diffusion mechanism is accepted by TMC (CCF A).
2024-12: Our one new paper on budgeted pricing is accepted in AAAI-2025 (CCF A).
2024-12: Our one new paper on incentive mechanism design in federated learning is accepted in INFOCOM-2025 (CCF A).
2024-04: Our one new paper on the survey of budget feasible mechanism design is accepted in IJCAI-2024 (CCF A).
2023-09: Our one new paper on budgeted pricing bandit is accepted in JSAC (CCF A).
2023-08: Our one new paper on auction mechanism design is accepted in AIJ (CCF A).